The Case for Taxing Consumption by Weidenbaum, Murray L
Washington University in St. Louis 
Washington University Open Scholarship 
Murray Weidenbaum Publications Weidenbaum Center on the Economy, Government, and Public Policy 
Contemporary Issues Series 54 
7-1-1992 
The Case for Taxing Consumption 
Murray L. Weidenbaum 
Washington University in St Louis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/mlw_papers 
 Part of the Economics Commons, and the Public Policy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Weidenbaum, Murray L., "The Case for Taxing Consumption", Contemporary Issues Series 54, 1992, 
doi:10.7936/K7J38QPX. 
Murray Weidenbaum Publications, https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/mlw_papers/24. 
Weidenbaum Center on the Economy, Government, and Public Policy — Washington University in St. Louis 
Campus Box 1027, St. Louis, MO 63130. 
Other titles available in this series: 
44. Banking Reform Without Bailouts, 
James B. Burnham 
45. The Sense and Nonsense of Energy 
Conservation, Richard B. McKenzie 
46. The Seeds of Entrepreneurship, 
Dwight Lee 
47. Capital Mobility: Challenges for 
Business and Government, 
Richard B. McKenzie and Dwight Lee 
48. Business Responsibility in a 
World of Global Competition~ 
James B. Burnham 
49. Small Wars, Big Defense: 
Living in a World of Lower Tensions, 
Murray Weidenbaum 
50. "Earth Summit": UN Spectacle with 
a Cast of Thousands, Murray W eidenbaum 
51. Fiscal Pollution and the Case 
for Congressional Term Limits, 
Dwight Lee 
52. The Limits of Pollution Prevention, 
James Lis with Kenneth Chilton 
53. Global Warming Research: Learning 
from NAPAP's Mistakes, Edward Rubin 
Additional copies are available from: 
Center for the Study of American Business 
Washington University 
Campus Box 1208 
One Brookings Drive 
St. Louis, Missouri 63130-4899 ~\X!clshing!QD 
Phone: (314) 935-5630 \1.\.,f!I".{OTC'!, 1 "\Hl'>fll'" 'Tll~ij' 
The Case for Taxing 
Consumption 
Murray Weidenbaum 
Contemporary 
Issues Series 54 
July 1992 
C918 
Center for the 
Study of 
American Business 
Washington University • St. Louis 
Copyright~ 1992 by the Center for the Study of 
American Business. 
All rights reserved. 
The Case for Taxing 
Consumption 
Murray Weidenbaum 
A low-saving, slow-growing economy such 
as the United States would benefit greatly from 
shifting the national revenue system from 
taxing income to taxing consumption. That 
change would provide a powerful incentive to 
increase the nation's saving and investment 
and, hence, economic growth and living stan-
dards. 
Introduction 
Public interest in changing the tax system is 
growing much faster than public understanding 
of the competing proposals. Democrats and 
Republicans, liberals and conservatives, all 
have come up with their favorite nominees for 
tax cuts - the poor, the middle class, manu-
facturers, savers, investors, producers of lux-
ury goods, and so forth. 
It seems desirable, under these circum-
stances, to broaden the public debate to go be-
yond the present inconsistent array of specific 
proposals to modify slightly the income tax, 
which is the heart of the existing federal rev-
enue system. Let us consider the most basic 
change in the government's income structure: 
abandon the whole idea of taxing income and 
shift to a consumption tax as the primary fed-
eral revenue source. 
As we will see, taxing consumption instead 
of income generates many impacts, mostly de-
sirable. A constant theme among tax reformers 
is the need for increased incentive for saving, 
capital formation, and economic growth. In 
that light, this report examines the pros and 
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cons o~ consumpti?n taxation and also analyzes 
the maJOr alternative approaches to structuring 
a new tax of that type. 
The governments of most industrialized na-
tions, especially in the European Community, 
use consumption taxes far more than the United 
States. While 18 percent of government rev-
enue comes from taxes on consumption in the 
United States, the comparable figures are 26 
percent for Germany, 29 percent for France, 
and 31 percent for the United Kingdom. 
The increasingly international nature of bus-
iness competition requires updating the Amer-
ican tax system to global realities. There are 
several basic arguments which economists have 
offered over the years for shifting the primary 
base of taxation from income to consumption. 
It puts the fiscal burden on what people take 
from society - the goods and services they 
consume - rather than on what they contribute 
by working and saving. Thus, saving is 
enc~uraged at the expense of consumption. 
Unlike current consumption, saving makes pos-
sible investment in future economic growth. 
True, problems will arise in setting up a new 
tax, just as difficulties are encountered with the 
more limited changes that Congress has been 
enacting yearly. 
There are two major types of consumption 
tax~s. One is a value-added tax (VAT), such 
as Is customary in Western Europe. The sec-
ond approach is to change the current income 
tax to an expenditure tax by exempting saving. 
Unlike selective excise taxes (such as those cur-
rently levied on cigarettes and alcohol), a 
value-added tax is comprehensive. It is paid by 
each enterprise in the chain of production -
manufacturer, wholesaler, and retailer. Dupli-
cation is avoided by taxing only the added 
value that the firm contributes to the goods or 
services it produces. Essentially, value added 
is the difference between a business's sales and 
its purchases from other companies. 
Let us examine the basic argument for en-
couraging capital formation by means of tax 
reform. 
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Promoting Investment and 
Economic Growth 
To many citizens, any discussion of capital 
formation immediately brings to mind visions 
of greedy bankers, wealthy coupon clippers, 
and - to use what is to many a pejorative 
wo:d- capitalists. Nevertheless, capital plays 
a pivotal role in providing the basis for the fu-
~re stan.dard of living of any society. Capital 
Is essential for increasing productivity and thus 
providing the basis for rising real incomes. 
A rising stock of capital is necessary 
for any growing society. 
Educators at times find it amusing when 
some of their students discover communist-
oriented economists writing about the necessity 
to hold down consumption in the Chinese econ-
omy in order to free up the capital resources 
needed to invest in the future growth of that 
economy. "Why, they are not even a capitalist 
society," these students will note· in wonder-
ment. 
Then the thought will sink in that a rising 
sto~k of capital is necessary for any growing 
society - capitalist (that is, private-enterprise 
o: market-oriented) or other (socialist, commu-
mst, and so on). It is really a basic matter of 
how much we want to eat, drink, and be merry 
today, and how much we want to set aside for 
tomorrow. Boiled down to its fundamentals 
0 ' 
assurmg an adequate flow of saving and invest-
ment is little more than demonstrating a proper 
concern for the future. 
A slow pace of capital formation in the 
United States is especially troublesome at a 
time of heightened global competition, when 
modern, state-of-the-art machinery and equip-
ment are necessary to match foreign firms with 
low-wage structures. 
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Any doubt about the tendency of the U.S. 
tax system to be biased in favor of consumption 
and against saving can be resolved quickly with 
a very simple example. Consider three factory 
workers, A, B, and C, each of the same age, 
with the same work experience and size of fam-
ily, and with the same compensation. Mr. A 
regularly spends what he earns, no more and 
no less. Mrs. B, a saver, deposits a portion of 
her paycheck into a savings account each week. 
Mr. C not only spends everything he earns but 
also borrows to the hilt, having bought as ex-
pensive a house as he could obtain financing 
for. 
It is interesting to compare the differential 
tax burden of these three workers. Clearly, 
Mrs. B, the saver, will have the highest tax 
bill, for she pays taxes on her wages as well as 
on the interest that she earns on her savings ac-
count. Mr. C winds up with lowest tax bill, as 
he receives a tax deduction for the interest he 
pays on his large mortgage. Actual practice in-
cludes many variations in the tax treatment of 
specific financial transactions. Yet, for the av-
erage citizen, the existing personal income tax 
structure favors consumption over saving. In 
addition, many of the government spending 
programs - such as welfare and food stamps 
- operate with a similar effect. 
Let us assume that A, B, and C all get laid 
off at the same time and that none of them ob-
tains ' a new job. Mr. C, the big spender, and 
Mr. A, the pay-as-you-go man, will quickly be 
eligible to receive welfare, food stamps, and re-
lated benefits. The last to qualify for federal 
assistance will be Mrs. B, the big saver. Un-
like the good Lord, the feds do not seem to 
help those who help themselves. 
Changing the Tax Structure 
All this is no justification for returning to 
the revenue structure of 1986 and prior years, 
although incentives for saving and investment 
were greater than they are today. Surely, the 
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elimination of many tax shelters was a definite 
plus for the efficiency of the economy, because 
so many of them had financed investments in 
uneconomical projects whose major purpose 
was to generate tax benefits. 
Nor is there a need to jump to the con-
clusion that the investment incentives available 
under the tax structure of the early 1980s pro-
vided the most cost-effective way of encour-
aging capital formation. Nevertheless, one im-
portant decision for the 1990s is to consider 
moving to a tax system that is more favorable 
to saving and investment, the keys to economic 
growth and rising living standards. 
Many analysts believe that it is fairer 
to tax people on what they take from society, 
rather than on what they contribute 
by working and investing. 
A fundamental tax change would be to sub-
stitute consumption for income as the basis for 
computing tax liabilities. A consumption-based 
tax has been described by the American Coun-
cil for Capital Formation as the next frontier in 
U.S. tax policy. 
Although the subject has only recently 
gained public attention, for years economists 
have debated the respective merits of income 
and consumption as the basis for taxation. The 
United States uses consumption taxes to a far 
lesser degree than most other developed West-
ern nations. In 1989, the 24 members of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development obtained an average 34 percent of 
their revenue from taxes on consumption. For 
the United States, the ratio was 15 percent. 
Japan has since increased its dependence on 
consumption taxation. 
Many analysts believe that it is fairer to tax 
people on what they take from society, rather 
than on what they contribute by working and 
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investing. In the nineteenth century, classical 
economist John Stuart Mill made this point in 
advocating the exemption of saving as part of a 
"just" income tax system. In the 1940s, 
American economist Irving Fisher argued that 
the income tax involved double taxation of sav-
ing and distorted the choice of individuals in 
favor of consumption. Thus, not only is the in-
come tax unjust, but it encourages consumption 
and leisure at the expense of thrift and enter-
prise. 
The U.S. Treasury actually proposed a 
"spending tax" in 1942 as a temporary wartime 
measure to curb inflation. The proposal was 
quickly rejected by Congress. A major ar~­
ment against such a tax - then and now - Is 
that the exemption of saving would favor the 
rich, since they are better able to save large 
portions of their incomes. Some believe that 
this would lead to greater concentrations of 
wealth in the hands of a few. Proponents of a 
consumption tax respond that it can be made as 
steeply progressive as desired. Moreover, the 
recent trend in income taxation in the United 
States has been away from progressive and to-
ward a flatter, more proportional revenue 
structure. The 1981 and 1986 tax statutes are 
striking cases in point. 
Another objection to the consumption base 
is that it would favor the miser over the spend-
thrift, even when both have similar spending 
power or ability to pay. The response offered 
to this argument is that consumption uses up 
the resources available to the nation, while sav-
ing adds to these resources. Thus, people 
should be taxed on what they take out of the 
society's pool of resources, not on what they 
put into it. 
Tax experts have devised, and criticized, a 
variety of specific consumption-based taxes. 
No consensus has yet been reached on the de-
tails. It is likely that three interrelated clusters 
of issues will receive increased public attention 
in the 1990s: (1) the desirability of a tax on 
consumption, (2) the specific form that it 
should take ("top down" or "bottom up"), and 
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(3) whether it should replace or augment an 
existing tax. 
A Consumption Tax 
In practice, much of the impact of shifting 
to a consumption tax base would depend on 
how the tax was structured. The two major 
alternatives are consumption taxes levied on 
total purchases (top down) and value-added 
taxes collected on individual sales (bottom up). 
In theory, the base of the two taxes is the same 
(the value of goods and services purchased) and 
the yields could be very similar. 
The income tax encourages consumption 
and leisure at the expense of 
thrift and enterprise. 
Consumption taxes would be collected much 
as income taxes are, levied directly on the tax-
payer. The annual taxpayer return would c?n-
tinue to comprise the heart of the colle~tiOn 
system containing exemptions and deductiOns, 
as at present. However, ~ne m~jor change 
would be instituted: the portion of Income that 
is saved would be exempt from taxation. 
Figure 1 is a hypothetical example of a 
"short form" version of a consumption tax re-
turn. It shows how the difficult bookkeeping 
requirement to tally all consumption outlays 
could be structured. The illustrative tax form 
is based on the notion that income equals con-
sumption plus saving. Thus, consumption can 
be readily estimated, indirectly but accurately, 
merely by deducting saving from income (and 
taxpayers are used to developing estimates . of 
their incomes). That new schedule would In-
clude changes in bank balances and in holdings 
of bonds, stocks, and similar investment assets. 
A tax on consumption could be made as 
progressive as any income tax by adjusting the 
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Figure 1 
Illustrative Consumption 
Tax Return 
Receipts 
1. Wages, salaries, tips, etc. 
2. Dividends 
3. Interest 
4. Rents and royalties 
5. Pensions and annuities 
6. Net receipts of sole proprietorships 
7. Withdrawals from partnerships 
8. Receipts from: 
a. sales of financial assets 
b. gifts and bequests 
c. insurance 
9. Net decrease (if any) in 
bank accounts 
10. Total (add lines 1 through 9) 
Saving 
11. Purchases of financial assets 
12. Capital contributed to partnerships 
13. Net increase (if any) 
in bank accounts 
14. Other investments 
15. Total (add lines 11 through 14) 
16. Gross Consumption 
(subtract line 15 from line 10) 
Deductions 
17. A. Itemized deductions 
or 
B. Standard deduction 
18. Federal taxes paid during the year 
19. Total (add lines 17 and 18) 
20. Net Consumption (subtract 
line 19 from line 16) 
21. Exemptions 
22. Taxable Consumption 
(subtract line 21 from line 20) 
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Amounts 
rates. Like the income tax, it could be used as 
part of fiscal policy to fight inflation or reces-
sion. In the longer run, it might generate more 
revenue - or permit rate reductions - to the 
extent that the added savings stimulate econom-
ic growth. 
For a while, the United States was moving 
toward a consumption tax, albeit indirectly and 
in modest steps. The establishment of inde-
pendent retirement accounts {IRAs) enabled 
many federal taxpayers to defer paying taxes on 
amounts saved and invested in an IRA (up to 
$2,000 a year). Also, the first $100 of divi-
dends per taxpayer was exempt from income 
taxation. The 1986 tax law, however, sharply 
cut back on IRAs and eliminated the dividend 
credit. 
A Value-Added Tax 
A consumption tax, as shown above, can be 
calculated via a "top down" approach, building 
on the records that are already available to pro-
vide the data needed for the collection of cor-
porate and personal income taxes. In contrast, 
a value-added tax (VAT) represents a very dif-
ferent way of collecting a general tax on con-
sumption, focusing on the sales to consumers 
by individual companies. In total, a VAT 
should be equivalent in yield to a single-stage 
sales tax levied at the retail level. It is, in ef-
fect, a sophisticated and comprehensive sales 
tax which avoids the double counting otherwise 
inevitable when the same item moves from 
manufacturer to wholesaler to retailer. 
Essentially, a firm's value added is the dif-
ference between its sales and its purchases from 
other firms. As shown in Table 1, value added 
can also be estimated by adding labor and cap-
ital inputs supplied by the firm itself - repre-
sented by wages and salaries, rent and interest 
payments, and profit. 
Reasons for Favoring a VAT 
Proponents of the VAT contend that it is 
economically neutral, because ideally it would 
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Table 1 
Two Methods of Computing 
Value Added 
Raw 
Materials Manu- Whole Cumu-
Item Producer facturer saler Retailer lative 
Purchases 
of inputs $100 $500 $800 $1,400 
Value Added: 
Wages $60 $275 $200 $100 $635 
Rent 10 25 40 50 125 
Interest 10 50 25 25 110 
Profit 20 50 35 25 130 
Total Value 
Added $100 $400 $300 $200 $1,000 
Sales of 
output $100 $500 $800 $1,000 $2,400 
Note: Value added can be estimated in two ways: 
(1) Deducting purchases from .sales of outp!-lt . 
(2) Adding inputs by the firm Itself (excludmg mputs 
supplied by others); thus $2,400- $1,400 = $635 + 
$125 + $110+ $130 = $1,000 
be levied at a uniform rate on all items of con-
sumption. It does not distort choices among 
products or methods of production. Thus, 
shifting to a more capital-intensive and perhaps ) 
more profitable method of production does not ~ 
influence the tax burden. Many of these J 
arguments apply with equal force to any 
compre-hensive tax on consumption. Nor is 
the allocation of resources across product, 
market, and industry lines affected by a tax on 
value-added. In these regards, the VAT is far 
superior to the existing array of selective excise 
taxes. 
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Advocates of the value-added tax also point 
out that, in contrast to an income tax, there is 
no penalty for efficiency and no subsidy for 
waste. Moreover, the VAT is neutral between 
incorporated and unincorporated businesses 
and, theoretically, even between public and pri-
vate enterprises. By focusing on consumptiOn, 
it avoids a double tax burden on the returns 
from capital. This tax starts off with no exclu-
sions or exemptions and thus, at least initially, 
provides a broader and fairer tax base, one that 
the underground economy will have more diffi-
culty evading. Consumption taxes such as the 
VAT are levied on the returns to labor (wages 
and salaries) equally with the returns on capital 
(rent, interest, and profits). 
1he VAT has become one of the revenue 
workhorses of the world. 
Another argument in favor of U.S. adoption 
of a value-added tax is that so many other na-
tions have adopted this form of revenue. It fits 
in better than other taxes with the growing in-
ternational character of production. The VAT 
has become one of the revenue workhorses of 
the world. Virtually every important country 
in Europe imposes the tax and it has spread 
throughout the Third World. The members of 
the European Common Market have used VAT 
taxation since the late 1960s or early 1970s. In 
1989, Japan imposed a broadbased 3 percent 
sales tax. 
Unlike the situation in the United States, the 
adoption of a tax on value added was true re-
form in Western Europe. Value-added taxes 
typically replaced an extremely inefficient form 
of consumption tax that was already in place, a 
cascading sales or turnover revenue system. 
Those latter taxes apply to the total amount of a 
firm's sales rather than only to its value added. 
Sales taxes, thus, would be paid over and over 
again on the same items as they moved from 
firm to firm in various stages of the production 
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and distribution process. Such cascade-type 
taxes favored integrated firms (who could legal-
ly avoid one or more stages of the tax), but 
they severely discriminated against independent 
companies who operate at only one phase of the 
production process. · 
An added, widely cited reason for adopting 
a VAT is the anticipated foreign trade benefits. 
Unlike an income tax, a sales-based tax can be 
imposed on goods entering the country and re-
bated on items leaving - supposedly encour-
aging exports and discouraging imports. Thus, 
at first blush, a VAT would seem to help re-
duce this nation's presently large deficit. 
However, most economists believe that 
fluctuations in exchange rates would largely 
offset these initial effects and result in little 
change in the balance of trade. 
Reasons for Opposing a VAT 
Opponents of a value-added tax offer an 
extensive list of shortcomings. They contend 
that a VAT, as in the case of any consumption-
based revenue source, is inherently regressive 
-those least able to pay face the highest rates. 
That regressivity can be softened by exempting 
food and medicine or by refunds to low-income 
taxpayers, but such variations make the collec-
tion of the tax more complicated. They also 
provide opportunity for people in the under-
ground economy to avoid paying taxes. 
Because the VAT is included in the price of 
purchases, it registers in all of the price indices 
and, hence, exerts an inflationary force on the 
economy. The counterargument is that this is 
only a one-time effect, occurring when the tax 
is enacted or increased. However, there would 
be secondary effects resulting from the opera-
tion of automatic escalators in wage and price 
agreements. That inflationary impact could be 
offset by appropriate changes in monetary pol-
icy, albeit at times with an adverse effect on the 
levels of production and employment. Oppo-
nents also charge that a VAT would invade the 
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area of sales taxation, traditional! y reserved for 
state and local governments. However, states 
and some localities, have come to rely on in-
come taxes despite heavy use of the same tax 
base by the federal government. 
Turning to the administrative aspects, impo-
sition of a value-added tax in the United States 
would require establishing a new tax-collection 
system by the federal government and new 
recordkeeping on the part of taxpayers. The 
Treasury Department, based on European expe-
rience, believes it would need 18 months after 
enactment to begin administering a VAT. 
The Treasury Department, based on 
European experience, believes it would 
need 18 months after enactment to begin 
administering a VAT. 
A variety of approaches has been suggested 
for collecting the new tax. The simplest is the 
credit method (see Table 2). Under this ap-
proach, the tax is computed initially on a com-
pany's total sales and the firm is given credit 
for the VAT paid by its suppliers. To a sub-
stantial degree, such a VAT would be self-
enforced. Each company would have a power-
ful incentive to ensure that its suppliers paid 
their full share of the tax, because any under-
payment would have to be made up by the next 
firm in the chain of production and distribu-
tion. 
In practice, the collection of the VAT may 
not be as simple as shown here. That would be 
the case if certain transactions were exempted 
(such as food) and if nonprofit institutions and 
government enterprises were treated different! y 
from business firms. Exemptions are no minor 
matter in terms of the administrative complex-
ity that they generate. In France, a long and 
extensive debate occurred over whether or not 
Head and Shoulders anti-dandruff shampoo was 
a tax-exempt medicine or a cosmetic subject to 
the full VAT. 
13 
Table 2 
Computing the· VAT Using 
the Credit Method 
Raw Manu- Whole-
Item Materials facturer saler Retailer 
Producer 
Sales of output $100 $500 $800 $1,000 
Less purchases _Q 100 500 800 
Value added $100 $400 $300 $200 
Tax on total sales $10 $50 $80 $100 
Credit on 
purchases - 10 50 80 
-
Tax liability $10 $40 $30 $20 
Note: Assumes 10 percent VAT on a consumption basis. 
There is a great variation in the VAT rates 
within the various countries that use it. In 
Western Europe, the standard VAT rate ranges 
from 12 percent in Spain to 25 in Ireland, al-
though some luxury items are taxed at higher 
rates. However, Spain taxes some items at as 
low as 6 percent and Ireland's VAT on occa-
sion is down to 2.4 percent. The United King-
dom has a zero tax on books and food. The 
future minimum VAT rate in the European 
Community has been set at 15 percent. 
Macroeconomic Effects 
On the basis of 1990 levels of economic ac-
tivity, a 5 percent VAT would yield in the 
neighborhood of $100 billion in federal revenue 
(depending on the coverage of the tax). If the 
VAT is considered to be an additional source 
of federal revenues, fiscal flows of such mag-
nitude likely would generate a variety of other 
impacts on the economy. For example, these 
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estimates of the yield of the VAT assume that 
the Federal Reserve will follow an accommo-
dating monetary policy, with a somewhat in-
flationary effect. 
Because the withdrawal of such substantial 
amounts of purchasing power would act as a 
depressant on the economy, a tax of that 
magnitude might be phased in over a period of 
time - or offset by reductions in existing in-
come taxes. One econometrics analysis con-
cludes that the economy would grow about 1 
percent more slowly for each 1 percent of VAT 
levied and that inflation would be 1-112 to 2 
percent higher during an initial adjustment 
period. 
In policy terms, the institution of a new tax 
in the 1990s should not be viewed in isolation 
but in comparison to likely alternatives: 
• Foregoing desirable increases in govern-
ment programs; 
• Increasing income tax rates; or 
• Continuing with high levels of deficit fi-
nancing. 
Each of these other approaches to the budget 
problem would be accompanied by substantial 
burdens or costs, although they would differ 
from those generated by the imposition of a 
consumption-based tax such as a VAT. Fore-
going increases in education, infrastructure, 
and research and development might have ad-
verse consequences on the prospects for eco-
nomic growth. Reversal of the 1980s trend 
toward lower marginal income tax rates would 
reduce the incentives to work, save, and invest. 
Continued high levels of deficit spending would 
bring their own set of drawbacks, ranging from 
high real interest rates to upward pressure on 
the dollar and thus on the foreign trade deficit. 
Value-Added Tax as a 
Substitute 
The substitution of a value-added tax for all 
or portions of existing income and payroll taxes 
is also a possibility. In the recent past, several 
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proposals have been made to make the VAT a 
part of the U.S. tax structure. 
In 1980, Representative AI Ullman (D-
Ore.), then Chairman of the House Ways and 
Means Committee, introduced a comprehensive 
revenue bill. It provided for individual and 
corporate income tax rate reductions, liberal-
ized depreciation rules, expanded retirement 
savings provisions and reduced Social Security 
taxes, all of which were offset by a 10 percent 
tax applied to a moderately narrow value-added 
base (which excluded food, housing, medical 
care, farmers, fishermen, mass transit, interest, 
and exports). Ullman's defeat for reelection 
soon after dampened the enthusiasm for a VAT 
for some time. 
In 1985, Senator William Roth (R-Del.) 
proposed a variation of the VAT called a Busi-
ness Transfer Tax (BTT). It would be a way in 
which companies could pay for their Social Se-
curity tax liabilities. The base for the new tax 
would be similar to the earlier Ullman pro-
posal. His bill also called for using the net 
revenues of his consumption-style tax (after the 
Social Security credit) to reduce individual tax 
rates and to provide increased individual saving 
incentives. In 1986, Senator Roth outlined ex-
plicit income tax rate reductions and invest-
ment-related provisions which would be funded 
by revenues from an eight percent BTT (after 
the Social Security credit) applied to a much 
broader base than his earlier proposal. 
In 1992, former California Governor Jerry 
Brown proposed a 13 percent value-added tax 
to accompany the move to a flat income tax at 
the same rate. 
Conclusions 
On balance, it seems that a "top down" con-
sumption tax would achieve most of the bene-
fits intended for a VAT with few of the short-
comings of that "bottom up" type of revenue 
measure. Converting the income tax to a con-
sumption tax - unlike adopting a new tax on 
value added - does not require setting up an 
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additional collection system. Nor is it regres-
sive or inflationary. Unlike a VAT, trans-
forming the existing income tax does not pro-
vide the federal government with a new rev-
enue source; therefore, the public sector is not 
likely to grow as rapidly. 
In contrast, a value-added tax becomes 
complicated if an effort is made to soften its 
regressivity by exempting certain categories of 
expenditures or taxing them at lower rates 
(e.g., food, medicine, education). 
Converting the income tax to a 
consumption tax - unlike adopting a new 
tax on value added - does not require 
setting up an additional collection system. 
It is not surprising that politicians in many 
countries favor sales-type taxation on the as-
sumption that the best tax is a hidden tax. The 
fact is that "bottom up" sales taxes such as a 
VAT are rarely identified separately, and the 
purchaser merely pays a combined product-and-
tax price. That type of consumption tax thus 
finds business firms acting as the middleman 
(or woman) between government and the con-
sumer. Many companies marketing consumer 
products fear that the higher prices resulting 
from imposing a VAT will reduce their sales 
and profits. Conversely, companies selling 
capital equipment and business services tend to 
take a more sympathetic attitude toward this 
form of government revenue, which would 
lighten the tax burden on their customers and, 
hence, tend to expand their markets. . 
Changing the income tax to a comprehen-
sive consumption tax, in contrast, would not be 
shielded from the knowledge of the taxpayer 
and is not likely to generate such differential 
reactions. In any event, the shift in emphasis 
in U.S. taxation from income to consumption 
should on balance generate positive results, es-
pecially in helping to move the economy to a 
17 
more rapid expansion path and, thus, enable the 
American people to enjoy a higher living stan-
dard. 
18 
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